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Choice processes and their post-decisional consequences in morally
conflicting decisions
Amy R. Krosch∗† Bernd Figner∗‡ Elke U. Weber∗§
Abstract
Morally challenging decisions tend to be perceived as difficult by decision makers and often lead to post-decisional
worry or regret. To test potential causes of these consequences, we employed realistic, morally challenging scenarios
with two conflicting choice options. In addition to respondents’ choices, we collected various ratings of choice options,
decision-modes employed, as well as physiological arousal, assessed via skin conductance. Not surprisingly, option
ratings predicted choice, such that the more positively rated option was chosen. However, respondents’ self-reported
decision modes also independently predicted choice. We further found that simultaneously engaging in decision modes
that predict opposing choices increased decision difficulty and post-decision worry. In some cases this was related to in-
creased arousal. Results suggest that at least a portion of the negative consequences associated with morally challenging
decisions can be attributed to conflict in the decision modes one engages in.
Keywords: morality, moral dilemma, decision making, decision conflict, values, decision modes, skin conductance,
post-decisional consequences.
1 Introduction
Imagine that you are a peacekeeper whose duty is to keep
two previously warring factions from fighting. One of
the factions starts to shell the town you are in. Thousands
of shells fall and suddenly hundreds of people from the
other faction are outside your camp, trying to get away
from the shelling. You ask your commanding officer for
permission to let them in, but are given the strict order not
to do so, because it would imperil the perceived neutral-
ity of your unit and could result in the harm of an even
greater number of civilians. Do you let them in or turn
them away? Regardless of which option you pick, would
you be able to move forward effortlessly, forgetting about
your decision and its consequences, or would you rumi-
nate over your decision, wondering what would have hap-
pened had you decided to take the other option?
Moral choices such as this can be expected to produce
more post-decisional rumination than choices without a
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moral dimension because of the gravity of such deci-
sions. Such decisions seem to lack clear right or wrong
options, and they force decision makers to choose what
often seems to them to be the lesser of two evils. When
decision makers simultaneously embody multiple roles
(such as the role of soldier who needs to obey orders ver-
sus the role of humanitarian who wants to help), we can
expect different decision making strategies leading to dif-
ferent choices and resulting pre- and post-decisional con-
flict. How then are such moral decisions made and how
can they be made in a way that may minimize negative
post-decisional consequences?
1.1 Moral choice conflict and consequences
A moral conflict occurs when objectives, values, or ide-
als that elicit strong reactions in a person compete. In-
dividuals often have a number of social roles that force
them to make tradeoffs between simultaneously held sets
of values, goals, or interests (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997). A
decision maker may consider violating either of these val-
ues to be inexcusable, because both values are protected
(Baron & Leshner, 2000) or sacred (Tetlock, Kristel, El-
son, Green, & Lerner, 2000). This type of choice is con-
sidered “tragic”, in the sense that no action will go unre-
gretted.
Being forced to make such morally conflicting de-
cisions can have immediate negative consequences for
the decision maker. Participants confronted with such a
trade-off report experiencing decision difficulty, negative
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emotion surrounding the decision, and diminished confi-
dence in the decision they make (Hanselman & Tanner,
2008; Mandel & Vartanian, 2008).
Engagement in decision conflict might also give rise to
negative downstream consequences following moral de-
cisions. Indeed, decision research suggests that decision
conflict can result in post-decisional worry (Zakay, 1993;
Janis & Mann, 1977), regret (Loomes & Sudgen, 1982;
Bell 1982; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Sagi & Fried-
land, 2007), and rumination (Handgraaf, Zeelenberg &
Manstead, 1997; Savitsky, Medvec, & Gilovich, 1997, as
cited in Zeelenberg, Inman & Pieters, 2001).
Peacekeepers, in their daily duties, are exposed to sit-
uations involving moral decision conflict. By definition,
their duty is to keep the peace, suggesting an emphasis
on humanitarian values. At the same time, their mili-
tary training has taught them to obey authority. It has
been argued that conflict between such values contributes
to the documented increase in stress that peacekeepers
face (Richardson, Naifeh, & Elhai, 2007; Litz, Orsillo,
Friedman, Ehlich, & Batres, 1997). Qualitative accounts
of peacekeeping soldiers involved in making moral deci-
sions reveal that they question whether they did the right
thing afterwards (worry/regret) and replay the scenario in
their minds (rumination) (Thompson, Adams & Sartori,
2006). In addition to these cognitive and emotional con-
sequences of moral decisions, it is possible people may
suffer physiologically through increased arousal, which
has been linked to negative health consequences (Cohen,
Kessler, & Underwood Gordon, 1997; Krantz, Glass,
Contrada, & Miller, 1981). Indeed worry, rumination,
and arousal are considered elements of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD; DSM-IV-TR, 2000), arguably one
of the worst post-decision consequences one could suf-
fer. Understanding the underpinnings of such decision
conflict may help elucidate and minimize these negative
post-decisional consequences.
1.2 Moral decisions and decision modes
People use a range of qualitatively different ways to ar-
rive at decisions (Weber, Ames & Blais, 2005; Weber &
Lindemann, 2007). Although such decision modes of-
ten operate in parallel, decision makers attend to them to
different degrees at different times and contexts, because
the modes tend to satisfy different goals (Weber & Lin-
demann, 2007). Guiding this framework is the assump-
tion that expressed preferences are constructed, and that
context, active goals, and activated roles and values deter-
mine the construction process. Use of different decision
modes often determines choice, because different modes
focus attention on different aspects of choice alternatives
and the choice environment (Weber & Johnson, 2009).
Decision makers often embody several roles at once,
and different roles may give rise to decision modes that
lead to conflicting outcomes. Consider again the opening
example of a peacekeeper who must balance humanitar-
ian and military roles (and corresponding mode-use). On
one hand, the peacekeeper’s role as a humanitarian (and
the corresponding value placed on helping people) gives
rise to modes associated with that value which should
lead to the choice of the humanitarian option (let the
refugees into the camp). On the other hand, the peace-
keeper’s role as a militarily trained combat soldier (and
the corresponding value placed on authority and obe-
dience) gives rise to modes associated with that value,
which should lead to the choice of the military option
(turn the refugees away). The current study seeks to
examine the way mode-use in moral dilemmas and, in
particular, multiple mode-use, may give rise to decision
conflict and to the negative consequences of such con-
flict, such as decision difficulty, post-decisional worry,
and arousal. We hypothesized that when roles are in op-
position and lead to use of opposing decision modes, the
result is an increase in these negative consequences.
1.3 Current study
This study employed realistic moral scenarios developed
as part of a project with Defense Canada and based on
actual experiences of Canadian peacekeepers. Each sce-
nario pits a humanitarian option of helping people against
a military option of following orders. Our predictor vari-
ables included participants’ perceived consequences of
each option as well as self-reports of the decision modes
they used to arrive at their choices, both hypothesized to
influence their choices. Our dependent variables of inter-
est were participants’ choice (Humanitarian or Military
option) and post-decision measures of how much diffi-
culty participants had making the decision and how much
they expected to worry in the future about the decision
they made. Skin conductance, measured when partic-
ipants made their choices, was used as an indicator of
arousal.
Consequentialism (for reviews see Darwall, 2003; Pet-
tit, 1993) holds that expected social, emotional, and ma-
terial consequences should determine choice. If this
were followed, the option with the best perceived con-
sequences would be more likely chosen. For example,
if the humanitarian option is associated with more pos-
itive consequences, it is more likely to be chosen than
the military option. In contrast, multiple decision-mode
models (Weber, Ames, Blais, 2005; Weber & Lindemann,
2007) predict that use of a specific mode would influence
choice, in addition to the perceived consequences of the
different choice options. Additionally, they should influ-
ence choice in predictable ways.
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Researchers focusing on moral decision making in mil-
itary scenarios have identified several modes important in
such decisions: Consequence (weighing costs and ben-
efits), Self-Interest (protecting one’s own well-being),
Emotion (involvement of emotions and immediate reac-
tions), Care (concern for others), Role (use of scenario-
provided role), and Virtue (use of principles) (Catano,
Kelloway, & Adams-Roy, 2000; Dursun, Morrow, &
Beauchamp, 2003). In the current study, Care and Emo-
tion should predict choice of the Humanitarian option,
since “showing concern for another person” and “react-
ing to the emotions involved”, respectively, suggest help-
ing people. Role and Self-Interest should predict choice
of the Military option, since “letting your roles determine
a course of action” and “looking out for yourself”, re-
spectively, suggest following the rules and obeying or-
ders. Use of Consequence (e.g., “weigh potential bene-
fits against risks”) and Virtue modes (e.g., “do the right
thing”) should predict choice of the option that would re-
sult in the most favorable outcome, and would be aligned
with actions people deemed virtuous, respectively. We
had no clear prediction how modes based on Conse-
quence or Virtue would influence choice in our scenar-
ios, as it seemed plausible that positive consequences and
virtuousness could apply to either option.
Further, we predicted simultaneous use of modes that
predicted opposite choices (incongruous modes; e.g.,
Care and Rule) would cause participants more difficulty
making the decision, and more projected worry in the fu-
ture. That is, when people make a decision both strongly
“showing concern for another person” and at the same
time strongly agreeing with “let their roles determine
their course of action”, we expected them to have a more
difficult time eventually making a decision, and similarly,
more worry about the decision they made.
Finally, we measured the relationship between con-
flicting decision modes and skin conductance response as
a physiological measure of arousal during decision mak-
ing. We hypothesized that engaging in incongruous deci-
sion modes would also be associated with increased phys-
iological arousal.
2 Method
2.1 Participants
Sixty-three (33 female) participants were recruited using
flyers around campus and the Columbia Business School
Behavioral Research Lab on-line recruiting system. Their
ages ranged from 18 to 61 (M = 28.08, SD = 10.93) and
they participated in return for a flat-fee payment of $15
for a single session that lasted approximately half an hour.
2.2 Materials and procedures
Two military moral decisions (Refugee Camp and Super-
vise Soldier) allowed us to examine our hypotheses and
two everyday trivial decisions (Toothpaste and Weather)
served as controls (see Table 1). Each scenario provided
two choice options. The military moral scenarios were
based on real events reported in interviews conducted by
the Defense Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
with returning peacekeepers (Thompson, Adams, & Sar-
tori, 2006). The military moral scenarios pit a human-
itarian option against a military option. The everyday
scenarios were chosen from a pool of scenarios that had
been rated with respect to their ethical content by a differ-
ent sample of respondents, and those with lowest ethical
content were selected. In the everyday scenarios, none of
the choice options had ethical or moral implications.
Participants were presented the four scenarios one at a
time, each following the same procedure (all stimuli were
presented and responses recorded on the computer). First,
participants were presented with the description of a sce-
nario and asked to carefully imagine themselves in the
described situation. For example, in the Refugee Camp
scenario (the opening example of this paper), participants
were asked to imagine themselves in the role of a soldier
on a mission trying to keep peace between two warring
factions. While guarding the entrance of a camp, a group
of refugees outside the camp needs help and requests to
enter the camp to find shelter from an attack. However
there are strict orders not to help them, in order to re-
tain impartiality. After having read the scenario, partici-
pants were presented with two choice options: “I let the
refugees in” and “I turn the refugees away,” but did not
yet register their choice.
Participants were then asked to imagine they were
choosing the first option and rated its perceived emo-
tional, social, and material consequences (Table 2; Haidt,
2003; Reidenbach & Robin 1990). Then, participants
were asked to imagine they were choosing the second op-
tion and answered the same questionnaire as before, but
with respect to the second option.
Finally, participants were asked to select their pre-
ferred option and answer a series of questions about the
scenario as a whole. The scenario was rated for its per-
ceived ethical content, the difficulty they experienced
making the decision, the post-decisional worry they an-
ticipated, and the decision modes that they used to make
the decision (Catano, Kelloway, & Adams-Roy, 2000;
Dursun, Morrow, & Beauchamp, 2003), as shown in Ta-
ble 3.
This sequence was repeated for each of the four sce-
narios, which were presented in random order (different
for each participant), and with the order of the two choice
options in each scenario counter-balanced across respon-
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Table 1: Scenarios and choice options. [Information in brackets was not shown to participants.]
Military ethical
HANDLING WARTIME REFUGEES [Refugee Camp]
Imagine that you are the commander of a unit on peacekeeping duty in a foreign country. There are two factions in
this country, and you are trying to keep them from fighting. Your orders are to avoid fighting or siding with either
faction. One of the factions starts to shell the town you are in. Thousands of bombs fall within 36 hours. Suddenly,
hundreds of people from the other faction are outside your camp, trying to get away from the bombing. You contact
headquarters for permission to let them in and the response is strict: don’t let them in. the concern is that our country
must maintain impartiality to be effective in keeping the peace: letting people into our camp makes it look as if we
are supporting their faction. Also, if we let a few in, thousands more will try to get in as well. We don’t have enough
resources to be able to keep them all safe, well-fed, and free from diseases. Which of the following do you pick?
I let them in [humanitarian-choice]
I turn them away [military-choice]
SUPERVISING A SOLIDER WHO DISOBEYS ORDERS [Supervise Soldier]
Imagine that you are the commander of a unit on peacekeeping duty in a foreign country. There are two factions in
this country, and you are trying to keep them from fighting. Your orders are to avoid fighting or siding with either
faction. One of your subordinates is somebody who has been your good friend for many years. Recently, he has been
getting sympathetic to one of the factions. One day, you find out that he has deployed soldiers into this faction’s area
for protection. This is directly contrary to your orders and to your mission. He needlessly puts soldiers” lives at risk,
in an immediate zone of danger. He probably felt strongly that he was saving civilians” lives, and was hoping that you
wouldn’t find out about it. In a case like this, military rules say that he should be relieved of command and sent for a
court-martial. However, you could reprimand him privately instead which may, however, risk your own career if the
story comes to light. Which of the following two options do you pick?
I reprimand him privately [humanitarian-choice]
I relieve him of command and have him court-martialed [military-choice]
Trivial
CHOOSING TOOTHPASTE [Toothpaste]
Imagine that you are almost out of toothpaste. You haven’t gone a day without brushing your teeth for at least ten
years. This situation is unacceptable. You need to make sure that you can get a good teeth brushing tomorrow morning,
and tonight you may use up the remaining toothpaste. You’re on a tight budget, but toothpaste is a must. You go to
the drug store and look for your regular brand of mint toothpaste. When you find it, you see that it costs $3.50 per
tube. You notice that there’s a generic mint toothpaste that costs $2.00 per tube. You’ve never tried the generic brand
before. Which of the following two options do you pick?
I buy my regular toothpaste
I buy the generic toothpaste
ENJOYING THE WEATHER [Weather]
Imagine that it’s a beautiful day outside. It’s Saturday and you’ve had a very stressful work week. You are thrilled
with the weather and that you have the entire day to relax and enjoy yourself in the outdoors. You decide to either go
for a beautiful bicycle ride along the city’s river bike-path where you can see the water and the skyline or else perhaps
to go for a stroll to your local park for a calming two mile walk around the pond. Which of the following two options
do you pick?
I go for a bike ride
I go for a stroll
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Table 2: Judgments of option characteristics (assessed us-
ing 7-point Likert-type scales)
Emotional Consequences
When you imagine yourself engaging in this option,
how much do you experience each of these emotions?
(“Not at all” to “Very much”)
Happiness
Sadness
Anxiety
Empathy
Guilt
Shame
Outrage
Desire to punish
Disgust
Anger
Pride
Fear
Social Consequences
How well do the following characteristics describe this
option? (“Not at all” to “Very much”)
Just
Fair
Morally right
Acceptable to my family
Culturally acceptable
Traditionally acceptable
Violates an unspoken promise
Violates an unwritten contract
Most people would consider this option to be (“Appro-
priate” to “Inappropriate”)
Material Consequences
How risky do you thinks this option is for you? (“Not
at all” to “Very”)
How beneficial do you thinks this option is for you?
(“Not at all” to “Very”)
The possible harm to others resulting from this option
would be: (“Minor” to “Severe”)
The changes of any negative consequences to others
occurring as a result of this option are: (“Not at all”
to “Very likely”)
Note: Option characteristic questions are listed here
categorized by the group to which they belong. Partic-
ipants saw them without any category labels.
dents.1 In order to assess physiological arousal, elec-
trodermal activity (EDA) was continuously measured,
following the recommendations of Figner and Murphy
(2011), using AcqKnowledge Software with the Biopac
Systems MP150 and a module for EDA (BIOPAC Sys-
tems, Inc. Goleta, CA). Two disposable sticky electrodes
were applied to the distal phalanges of the middle and the
ring fingers of participants’ non-dominant hand. The raw
EDA signal was converted into a signal reflecting stan-
dardized magnitude of skin conductance responses fol-
lowing Figner and Murphy (2011; SCR area bounded by
a curve).
3 Results
3.1 Ethical content of scenarios
Using a repeated-measures ANOVA, we verified that the
two military moral scenarios were judged by participants
to contain more ethical content than the two everyday sce-
narios, F(3, 186) = 258.45, p < .01. Bonferroni-corrected
post-hoc comparisons revealed that, as expected, there
was no significant difference between the two military
scenarios on ethical content (Refugee Camp: M = 6.02,
SD = 1.61; Supervise Soldier: M = 6.06, SD = 1.24),
nor between the two everyday scenarios (Weather: M
= 1.46, SD = 0.95; Toothpaste: M = 1.75, SD = 1.33),
but that both ethical scenarios differed significantly from
both trivial scenarios (p’s < .001). Since we were inter-
ested mostly in the consequences of decision conflict in
moral decisions, we restrict our subsequent analysis and
discussion to the two military scenarios.
3.2 Choice
As the two military scenarios were designed to produce
moral conflict between the provided response options,
with no clear right or wrong choice, we expected the two
options to be chosen about equally often. As predicted,
in the Refugee Camp scenario, 31 participants chose the
Humanitarian option, which prioritized an ethic of help-
ing others, while 32 chose the Military option, which
prioritized an ethic of following orders. In the Super-
vise Soldier scenario, 37 chose the Humanitarian option,
while 26 chose the Military option.
3.3 Predicting choice
3.3.1 Option characteristics
The basic assumption of traditional consequentialist de-
cision models is that people select the choice option that
1Order did not have an effect on any of the measures, and will not
be mentioned further.
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Table 3: Scenario judgments and mode use (assessed using 7-point Likert-type scales)
Difficulty: How difficult was it for you to choose between the two options
(“Not at all” to “Very”)
Post-decisional worry: Given the choice you made, if you had made this decision in real life, how often
would you worry that you had made the wrong decision?
(“Never” to “Very often”)
Ethical Content: To what extent does this decision involve ethics and morality?
(“Not at all” to “Very much”)
Modes: If you had to make this decision in real life, how likely would you be to follow each of the strategies
listed below?
(“Not at all” to “Very Likely”)
Care Emotion
Act out of care for others Follow your gut feeling(s)
Ensure as little harm as possible is done to others Trust your immediate affective reaction(s)
Show concern for another person/creature React to the emotions involved
Virtue Role
Do what a person of honor would do Follow society’s laws
Act with integrity Stick to organizational or social regulations
Do the “right” thing Let your roles or obligations determine a course of ac-
tion
Self-Interest Consequence
Protect your own self-interest Consider whether the ends justify the means
Act in your best interest Contemplate objectives to be achieved or avoided
Look out for yourself Weigh potential benefits against risks
Note: Participants saw questions in a random order, without any mode category labels.
offers the greater benefits and/or smaller costs. To test
such a model, we predicted choices by the difference in
respondents’ judgments of the two choice options on the
26 option characteristics, including emotional (e.g., How
angry would you feel?), social (e.g., How traditionally
acceptable is it?), and material consequences (e.g., How
risky is it?).
High multicollinearity between the 26 predictor vari-
ables prohibited including them all simultaneously in a
regression model. We therefore created a composite score
for each of the three categories (Emotional, Social, and
Material consequences),2 after first reverse scoring the
negative characteristics of each option, so that all char-
acteristics would relate positively to choice, and then cre-
ating a difference score for each dimension (e.g., [rated
justness of the humanitarian option] – [rated justness of
the military option]), and finally averaging those differ-
2A factor analysis of the characteristic scores confirmed our a-priori
grouping.
ence scores within each category.
We analyzed the effect of each of these three predictors
on choice using binary logistic regression. In the Refugee
Camp scenario, Social and Material consequences were
significant predictors of choice. For each point by which
the Humanitarian option was judged to be better than the
Military option on Social consequences, the probability
of choosing the Military option decreased by about half
(.49 = e–0.71 , p = .02). For every point by which Mate-
rial consequences were judged higher for the Humanitar-
ian option, the probability of choosing the Military op-
tion also decreased by about half (.49 = e-0.71 , p = .02).
Differences in Emotional consequences were not a signif-
icant predictor of choice. We found the same pattern in
the Supervise Soldier scenario, where Social and Material
consequences significantly predicted choice, with a point
increase in the difference in Social consequence measure
decreasing the probability of choosing the Military option
by one-fifth (.20 = e–1.60, p < .01), and a point increase in
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Table 4: Summary of individual logistic regression analyses for modes predicting choice.
Refugee Camp Supervise Soldier
Predictor B SE B eB B SE B eB
Care −0.84** 0.28 0.43 −0.33 0.22 0.72
Emotion −0.72*** 0.20 0.49 −0.29 0.18 0.75
Virtue −0.52* 0.22 0.60 0.99** 0.32 1.70
Consequence 0.39* 0.19 1.48 0.22 0.22 1.25
Role 1.16*** 0.31 3.19 1.76*** 0.40 5.81
Self-interest 0.36* 0.17 1.44 0.20 0.17 1.22
Note: eB = exponentiated B (odds ratio). Choice predictor s (Modes) took values from 1 to 7, with higher
values indicating a stronger reliance on that mode. Choice was coded as 0 for Humanitarian option and 1
for Military option (eB < 1 indicates that participants were less likely to choose the Military option if they
strongly relied on the respective mode, while eB > 1 indicates an increase in the likelihood to choose the
Military option).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
the difference in Material consequence measure decreas-
ing the probability by about one-third (.29 = e–1.25, p <
.01). Again, differences in Emotional consequences were
not a significant predictor of choice.
3.3.2 Decision modes
To test our hypothesis that use of different decision modes
would be associated with different choices, we analyzed
the effect of using each of the six modes on choice in
separate logistic regression analyses for the two scenar-
ios. As shown in Table 4, we found that in the Refugee
Camp scenario, all modes were significantly predictive of
choice: The Humanitarian option was predicted by Care-
, Emotion- and Virtue-based decision modes, while the
Military option was predicted by the Consequence, Self-
Interest and Role-based decision modes. In the Supervise
Soldier scenario, all modes but Virtue exhibited the same
pattern,3 though at lower levels of significance (see Table
4).
Figure 1 shows mode use as a function of choice as
a visual complement to the logistic regression analysis.
Participants who chose the Humanitarian option used
more Care and Emotion modes and less Consequence,
Role, and Self-Interest modes than those who chose the
Military option, across scenarios. More Virtue was used
by participants who chose the Humanitarian option in
Refugee Camp, and by those who chose the Military op-
tion in Supervise Soldier.
3In Supervise Soldier, Virtue changed direction and predicted the
Military option. Our measure of Virtue assessed the importance of “act-
ing with integrity,” which could apply to either option in this case.
3.3.3 Option characteristics and decision modes
Using a likelihood ratio test, we compared a model
predicting choice from option characteristics alone to a
model with option characteristics and decision modes.
We found that, as hypothesized, the model containing
modes predicted choice variance beyond option charac-
teristics alone in both the Refugee Camp (χ2(6) = 18.87,
p < .01) and Supervise Soldier (χ2(6) = 21.57, p < .01)
scenarios. Similarly, option characteristics had unique
predictive power beyond modes alone, i.e., the model pre-
dicting choice from option characteristics and modes pre-
dicted more variance than the model with modes alone in
both the Refugee Camp (χ2(6) = 11.37, p < .01) and Su-
pervise Soldier (χ2(3) = 20.94, p < .01) scenarios.
3.4 Decision difficulty, post-decision worry,
and arousal
Because (a) engaging in a specific decision mode was as-
sociated with the choice of a specific option and (b) par-
ticipants often used more than one decision mode, we
predicted that simultaneously engaging in incongruous
decision modes (modes that predicted opposing choices)
should lead to increased difficulty making the decision,
more anticipated post-decision worry, and higher levels
of physiological arousal.
In order to investigate the effect of simultaneously en-
gaging in incongruous decision modes, we first created
composite scores for the modes that predicted the same
choice option within each of the two scenarios (Modes
that predicted choice of the Humanitarian option = Hu-
manitarian modes; Modes that predicted choice of the
order following option = Military modes). That is, for the
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Figure 1: Mean reported mode-use (with SEM) by choice of Humanitarian or Military option for the two military-
ethical scenarios.
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Human option chosen
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Wartime refugee scenario
0
2
4
6
8
Humanitarian modes Military modes
Care Emotion Virtue Conseqen. Role Self−interest
Human option chosen
Military option chosen
Supervise soldier scenario
0
2
4
6
8
Humanitarian modes Military modes
Refugee Camp scenario, the Humanitarian modes com-
posite score was the average of indicated use of the Emo-
tion, Care, and Virtue modes; and the Military modes
composite score the average of the Role, Self-Interest,
and Consequence modes. For the Supervise Soldier sce-
nario, the Humanitarian modes composite score was the
average of indicated use of the Emotion and Care modes,
and the Military modes composite score the average of
Role, Self-Interest, Virtue, and Consequence.
3.4.1 Difficulty/worry
Decision Difficulty and Post-Decision Worry were pos-
itively correlated in each scenario (Refugee Camp: r =
.64, p < .01, Supervise Soldier: r = .67, p < .01), suggest-
ing that they assessed highly related aspects of the same
construct. Accordingly, we created a composite variable
of these two, from here on referred to as Difficulty/Worry.
For the Refugee Camp scenario, we first examined
the participants who chose the Military option, associ-
ated with high levels of using Military modes. We pre-
dicted that the extent to which these participants also
used Humanitarian modes (i.e., decision modes incon-
gruous to the Military modes) should correlate with in-
creased Difficulty/Worry, because the two types of de-
cision modes pull the participant in opposing directions.
Consistent with this prediction, we found a significant
correlation between use of Humanitarian modes and Dif-
ficulty/Worry (r = .36, p = .05) for these participants. This
result was replicated in the Supervise Soldier scenario (r
= .45, p = .02). The results indicate that the consider-
ation of modes incompatible with one’s final choice in-
creases both the difficulty of making this decision and
worry about it later on.
Next, we tested this same mechanism in participants
who chose the Humanitarian option, first in the Refugee
Camp scenario. Providing the predicted mirror image,
Difficulty/Worry was indeed positively correlated with
the reported use of Military Modes (r = .46, p < .01).
We again replicated this finding in the Supervise Soldier
scenario (r = .33, p = .04).
Finding the same mechanism in all four possible cases
provides converging evidence that, regardless of one’s fi-
nal choice, increased engagement of incongruous deci-
sion modes leads to increased decision difficulty and in-
creased expected worry later on.4
3.4.2 Physiological arousal
The reported results so far have been based on self-report
measures of difficulty and anticipated worry and concern.
We measured skin conductance as a measure of physio-
logical arousal during the decision to provide an addi-
tional consequence of experienced decision conflict and
to examine its relationship to the self-reported difficulty
in making the decision and projected future worry about
the decision (Difficulty/Worry).5 The measurement win-
4The same qualitative pattern of incongruous modes on Diffi-
culty/Worry was found at the individual decision mode level, using
medians splits. For example, participants high on both Care and Rule
reported more Difficulty/Worry than participants high on only one of
those modes, or neither.
5Sample size for analyses related to skin conductance was reduced
(N = 55), due to issues with data acquisition (electrode adhesion, par-
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dow in each of the scenarios started with the presentation
of the scenario and ended when participants chose one of
the options.
For participants who chose the Humanitarian option
in the Refugee Camp scenario, physiological arousal and
Difficulty/Worry were positively correlated, as expected
(r = .55, p < .01). Arousal was also positively correlated
with how strongly these participants used Military modes
(r = .40, p = .02), which were incongruous with their final
choice. Thus, this result gives some evidence that partic-
ipants might have experienced choice conflict not just at
a cognitive, but also at a physiological level.
Given that (a) the additional use of Military modes pre-
dicted Difficulty/Worry (b) Military modes use predicted
arousal, and (c) arousal predicted Difficulty/Worry, we
tested whether the effect of Military mode use on Diffi-
culty/Worry was mediated by physiological arousal. In-
deed, using the SPSS macro developed by Preacher and
Hayes (2008), we found evidence for mediation: The ef-
fect of Military mode use on Difficulty/Worry (path c)
was significantly mediated by the indirect path consist-
ing of the positive effect of Military mode use on arousal
(path a: p = .04) and the positive effect of arousal on dif-
ficulty/worry (path b: p = .02); crucially, the a x b cross
product was significantly different from 0, indicating me-
diation (a x b: p < .05, one-tailed).6
For participants who chose the Military option in the
Refugee Camp scenario, physiological arousal and Diffi-
culty/Worry were also marginally positively correlated as
expected (r = .21, p = .15). However, Humanitarian mode
use was not significantly correlated with arousal.
The results for the Supervise Soldier scenario were
more mixed. For participants who chose the Humani-
tarian option, use of Military modes was not related to
arousal in this scenario (r = –.01, p = .39). Interestingly,
however, the level of Humanitarian mode-use (which was
congruous with their final choice) was negatively related
to arousal (r = –.34, p = .04), suggesting that in this sce-
nario, congruous mode use might have lessened arousal,
rather than incongruent mode use promoting it. The same
was true for participants who chose the Military option,
though the correlation between Military mode-use and
arousal was only approaching significance (r = –.32, p
= .07).
ticipant movement, etc.).
6We found the same pattern of results using a simpler test of me-
diation: M predicts Y in a regression of Difficulty/Worry (Y) onto skin
conductance (M) (B = .97, p < .01) and M also predics Y in a regression
of Difficulty/Worry (Y) onto Military modes (X) and skin conductance
(M) (B = .77, p = .02). Although we believe this reflects the underly-
ing relationship between variables, it is theoretically possible that Diffi-
culty/Worry mediates the relationship between Military modes use and
arousal or that there is a third varable affecting both skin conductance
and Difficulty/Worry (e.g., some internal state).
4 Discussion
Our results provide support for traditional consequential-
ist as well as for more recent mode-based models of de-
cision making. Consistent with consequentialist models,
we found that the option participants rated as more attrac-
tive on social and material dimensions was chosen more
often. In other words, perceived characteristics of choice
options predicted choice. However, our results also show
that modes of decision making also influence choice, and
predict additional choice variance, beyond the effect of
characteristics of choice options. However, the focus of
the present research was to expand the current literature
on decision modes by showing downstream effects when
two (or more) incongruous decision modes are simulta-
neously used. Observing not only increased decision dif-
ficulty but also projected future worry sheds light on the
potential causes of negative post-decision consequences.
Finally, we found preliminary evidence that—even in hy-
pothetical choice scenarios—conflict between incongru-
ous decision modes can be reflected in increased physio-
logical arousal.
Our finding that differences in option characteristics
(e.g., perceived riskiness of the Humanitarian option ver-
sus perceived riskiness of the Military option) predicted
choice is interesting because it provides evidence for a
traditional consequentialist decision model, where the
option with the greater benefits and/or the smaller costs
gets selected. However, we found that not all conse-
quences are equally important for choice. Interestingly,
social and material consequences predicted choice, while
emotional consequences did not. Emotional consequence
scores did vary less than social or material consequence
scores, providing one potential explanation. Also, emo-
tional consequences were those for the decision maker,
not for others, and a more inclusive measure of emotional
consequences might have played a greater role.
However we also found that self-reported mode-use
was predictive of choice, a result not predicted by a con-
sequentalist model. Care- and Emotion-based decision
modes predicted choice of the Humanitarian option (i.e.,
helping others), whereas Consequence- and Self-Interest-
and Role-based decision modes predicted choice of the
Military option (i.e., adherence to the rules) in both sce-
narios. The Virtue-based decision mode predicted the
Humanitarian option in one scenario and the Military op-
tion in the other. Taken together, these results provide
evidence for the importance of both consequences and
decision mode use in moral decision making.
Little research on moral decision making has focused
on the downstream consequences of such decisions for
decision makers. We found evidence that knowledge
about the processes people use (i.e., the decision modes)
to make morally challenging decisions can predict both
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the difficulty they have making these decisions as well as
the amount they expect to worry about those decisions in
the future and the arousal they exhibit when making these
decisions. Specifically, we showed that, when people en-
gage simultaneously in decision modes that predict op-
posing choices, they have more difficulty making the de-
cision, expect to worry about it more in the future, and, at
least under some circumstances, have heightened arousal.
This suggests that conflict between simultaneously-held
yet contradictory values that get expressed by competing
decision modes may be contributing to decision difficulty
and post-decision rumination and worry.
Our results resemble—in their safe laboratory mini-
cosmos—recent insights into the often stressful life of
real world peacekeeping soldiers: Peacekeepers, in their
daily duties, are routinely exposed to morally challenging
situations involving decision conflict, and Richardson et
al. (2007) reported that up to 20% of peacekeepers return
with significant symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disor-
der (PTSD). Interestingly Litz et al. (1997) suggested that
decision conflict resulting from competing roles and du-
ties might be a cause of PTSD, which can involve both
post-decisional worry and physiological arousal (DSM-
IV-TR, 2000). Furthermore, in a survey of active duty
military personnel who served as peacekeepers in Soma-
lia, soldiers’ ratings of the positive aspects of military
service were strongly negatively correlated with PTSD,
while the intensity of their frustration with the negative
aspects of being a peacekeeper was a strong predictor of
PTSD (Litz et al., 1997). In other words, when soldiers”
ratings indicated that they embraced their role as a sol-
dier (i.e., military service viewed as positive), they were
at a lower risk for PTSD, but when their ratings reflected
conflict between their role as peacekeeper and as a sol-
dier, they were at a higher risk for PTSD.
Although we do not claim that our scenarios involved
the same processes relevant for causing PTSD, it is in-
teresting to note that, by creating scenarios of decision
conflict arising from competing roles and examining their
influence on worry and arousal, we observed empirical
evidence suggesting that there might be indeed a relation-
ship between role conflict and (somatic) decision conse-
quences. We found that worry and skin conductance re-
sponses during participants’ choice processes in at least
one scenario were related to competition between roles
and the modes used associated with those roles. Skin
conductance reflects activity of the sympathetic branch of
the autonomic nervous system (Figner & Murphy, 2011;
Boucsein, 1992), which has been implicated in revisit-
ing traumatic events in patients with PTSD (Orr & Roth,
2000). Thus, it is possible that what we observed in our
scenarios and what real peacekeeping soldiers experience
in traumatic situations have a common basis, just on ex-
tremely different scales of magnitude and severity. How-
ever, if this is true, our finding that conflict between val-
ues during decision making and decision mode use is re-
lated to increased skin conductance responses would sug-
gests that the future study into the causes (and perhaps
prevention) of PTSD-like phenomena might benefit from
measurement of role conflict, decision modes, and phys-
iological arousal. In other words, although they clearly
have to be regarded as a first tentative step, our results on
the relationship between physiological arousal and deci-
sion difficulty and post-decisional worry point to possible
ways in which negative consequences related to decision
conflict might be studied in the laboratory, and eventually
avoided.
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